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CARRIERS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REASONABLE RATES.
The recent rate laws have been productive of much trouble
between the State and United States authorities. In both Missouri
and North Carolina, open conflict seems to have been averted only
by concessions on the part of the railroads. Domestic tranquility
already has been shaken because both state and federal powers are
endeavoring to control certain of the functions of these great arteries
of commerce. Two decisions, particularly, which have been the
subject of widespread interest and discussion throughout the Union,
are Southern Ry. Co. v. M'Neil, I55 Fed. 756 (N. C.), and Sea-
board Air Line Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 155 Fed. 792
(Ala.).
It is a well settled rule that a State, unless (a) forbidden by its
own Constitution, or (b) estopped by its dealings with a corporation,
or unless (c) vested rights have been created in such corporation,
may at any time, and for any cause, exercise its sovereign, political
prerogative of preventing at its own pleasure (as distinguished from
its legal right to expel for cause) any foreign corporation from
doing a domestic business within its borders. Doyle v. Continental
Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535; Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 246.
This question arose in the Railroad Commission Case, where
Judge Jones held unconstitutional a recent statute of Alabama which
provided that the bringing of a suit by a foreign corporation in the
federal court "shall ipso facto forfeit all its right or license to engage
in or carry on business, originating and terminating in this State, of
freight or passengers, and its right or license to engage in or carry
on such business in this State shall by said act itself be revoked and
shall cease." -This statute, Judge Jones said, contravened both
the federal and State Constitutions. Section 24o of the Constitu-
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tion of Alabama gives the right to foreign corporations "to sue in
all courts, in like cases as natural persons." This section prevents
the State legislature from hampering the right to resort to the fed-
eral courts, as had been done in some States. It is an assurance to
all that Alabama would not depart from its traditional policy and
expel foreign corporations if they chose to exercise the same rights
as natural persons to resort to the federal courts. Such a law which
declares that a corporation is ipso facto expelled, because it resorts
to a federal court, is ipso facto a defiance of the Federal Constitution,
for it is an attempt to expel the corporation for doing something
which the Constitution gives it an express right to do. Insurance
Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186.
Again, this statute violated the obligations of contract, and
deprived the corporation of vested rights. The Legislature, in view
of the need of more railroads and the betterment of existing sys-
tems, had induced foreign corporations to aid in the development
of the State. On the faith of these proposals such corporations
entered Alabama, spent millions of dollars in the purchase and lease
of railroads, arranged their business accordingly, and acquired
rights thereby which the State cannot now arbitrarily forfeit.
The next interesting question arose as to the propriety of grant-
ing a preliminary injunction. "There may be situations," Judge
Jones says in the Alabama decision, "where the result of the opera-
tion of reduced rates, whether beneficial or otherwise, cannot well
be ascertained, except by their actual operation, in which event
courts may order such test." This was the rule applied in Missouri
in the recent case of St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Hadley, 155 Fed. 220.
But in the cases under discussion both Judge Pritchard and Judge
Jones held that if not enjoined the proposed rates might cause such
great and irreparable injury as to deprive the complainants of a right
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. When, therefore, the facts
shown by the complainant, taken in connection with the opposing
evidence, present a reasonable probability that the rates may be
adjudged invalid on final hearing, the court will balance the relative
harm which may befall the adverse interests from the issue of the
writ, and grant or withhold the writ accordingly. This desire of
the federal courts to preserve the statu quo where it appears that
the complainant is likely to suffer irreparable harm is so strong that
even when the judge considers the act constitutional, and dismisses
the bill, he may grant an order restraining the enforcement of the
act until the matter can be determined by the Supreme Court. Cot-
ting v. Kan. Stockyards Co., 183 U. S. 79; Hovey v. McDonald, lO9
U. S. I5O, 161.
As to rates prescribed for transportation of persons and prop-
erty carried only within the limits of the State, their reasonable-
ness, says Judge Jones, must be based upon the value of the prop-
erty devoted to interstate commerce, and neither the profits nor the
losses in the one business can be estimated in determining the reason-
ableness of the rates as to the other.
The rule that rates must be reasonable has always been recog-
nized. But the difficulty lies in framing a standard of reasonable-
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ness. Charges for transportation are based on ability to pay; they
are similar to taxes. And state regulation of rates is no new thing.
The real source of authority for state regulation is rather the fact
that property has been clothed with a public interest than the quasi
public character of the railroad corporation. Munn v. Illinois, 94
U. S. 113. But while the legislature may make a rate, the courts
alone may determine its reasonableness. Maximum Rate Case, 167
U. S. 499; Steenerson v. Gt. N. R. Co., 69 Minn. 353. State action
is, however, necessarily limited by the fact that its power extends
to intrastate commerce only; and when a State has acted, either by
itself, or through a commission (as was the case in North Carolina
and Alabama), there arises the further question whether its action
violates the Fourteenth Amendment This is purely a judicial ques-
tion. The inquiry of the courts is whether the rates prescribed are
so unreasonable that their enforcement will deprive the railroad of a
fair return upon its property-whether they are confiscatory. It
must clearly be understood that the courts cannot substitute their
judgment of a reasonable rate for that of the State: they cannot
question its expediency or propriety. That is mere administrative
work. The word "unreasonable," therefore, is equivalent to confis-
catory. The question is not whether the rate is unreasonable as
such, but so unreasonable as to amount to a taking of property.
Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362; Minneapolis, etc.,
R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 268.
While, therefore, the States have the power to fix rates, their
determination cannot be deemed conclusive. The assumption of
power by the Supreme Court to review the reasonableness of rates
has been growing, gradually for more than a quarter of a century.
(a) In 1876, in the Granger cases, the court declined to review the
reasonableness of rates fixed by States, holding this to be purely a
legislative question.. In other words, the States had the power to
fix rates which should be conclusive. Munn v. Illinois, supra; Chi-
cago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155. This doctrine was reaf-
firmed in Ruggles v. Illinois, 1o8 U. S. 526. (b) But after some
adverse dicta, this holding was, in 1889, modified in Chicago, etc.,
Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418. Here the court decided to
review the extent of rate regulation and held that legislative rates
must afford some, though it might be only a slight, income above
operating expenses. Covington v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578. (c)
Then in 1898, in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, the rule was laid
down that the basis of calculations as to reasonable rates "must be
the fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience
of the public." This case is different from those preceding it in
that the decision of the court was based on evidence taken at the
trial as to investments and earnings of the railways involved, instead
of on allegations or admission of parties to the suit. (d) And
finally, in Cotting v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., ubi supra, the
court says, "The question is not how much he makes out of his vol-
ume of business, but whether, in each particular transaction, the
charge is an unreasonable exaction for the services rendered. ...
He has a right to charge for each separate service that which is a
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reasonable compensation therefor, and the legislature may not deny
him such reasonable compensation, and may not interfere simply
because out of the multitude of his transactions the amount of his
profits is large." In this case a net income of 1O.9 per cent would
have been reduced by the law to 5.3 per cent. This case seems to
mark the complete transfer of power to determine what are reason-
able rates for public service from the state legislatures to the courts.
A final -important question in the principal cases was whether
these were suits against the State within the Eleventh Amendment.
In regard to this point there has been a gradual change of opinion.
(a) Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, held that the fact that a State
has an interest in the controversy, however extensive, will not bring
the case under the Amendment and exclude the federal jurisdiction
so long as the State itself is not a party. Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall.
203. (b) But this early rule was in effect overruled in Poindexter
v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270. See also in re Ayres, 123 U. S. 443,
where the court said that "the question whether a suit is within the
prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment is not always to be deter-
mined by reference to the nominal parties on the record." Then in
Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, it was said, "as a State can act only
by its officers, an order restraining those officers from taking any
steps, by means of judidial proceedings, in execution of a statute, is
one which restrains the State itself, and the suit is consequently as
much against the State as if the State were named as a party defend-
ant on the record." Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 386;
Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 6o. Since this is the law, the ques-
tion then is, When is the State the real party? Where an action
is brought against a state officer in charge of property claimed by
a prima facie valid title to be the property of the State, it is in effect
a suit against the State. In re Ayres, supra; Belknap v. Schild,
161 U. S. io. So a State may waive its privilege. Clark v. Bar-
nard, io8 U. S. 436. Or it may consent to be sued in its own courts
only. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436. But the State's interest
must be one in the State as an artificial person, as distinguished
from that of a governmental interest in the welfare of its citizens
in compelling obedience to the legal orders of its officials for the
benefit of the public at large. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S.
270, 290; Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Missouri Commissioners, 183
U. S. 53. So where (a) the suit is against officers of the State, as
representing the State's action and liability, thus making it the real
party against which judgment will operate, it is within the Amend-
ment. Fitts v. McGhee, supra; but where (b) the suit is against
defendants, who, claiming to act as officers of the State, and under
color of an unconstitutional statute, commit acts or wrong and
injury to the rights and property of the plaintiff, acquired under a
contract with the State, such suit is not an action against the State.
Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., ubi supra; Smyth v. Ames, ubi
supa. The principal cases were held to belong in this second class,
and are to be distinguished from Fitts v. McGhee, which was a suit
against the attorney-general of Alabama, where no state officer was
charged with the performance of any duty in connection with the
enforcement of the act.
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For these and other reasons the two cases under discussion are
valuable and interesting, dealing as they do with questions of great
moment.
ENACTMENT OF STATUTES-GOVERNOR'S APPROVAL.
A novel state of facts came before the Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas in the case of Powell v. Hayes, 104 S. W. 177. The governor of
the State being ill and absent, the president 6f the Senate, Hon.
John I. Moore, became acting governor. A bill which had passed
the legislature came before him for consideration. He signed it
one hour before Hon. X. 0. Pindall succeeded him as president of
the Senate and acting governor. Although Gov. Moore directed the
bill to be taken to the office of the Secretary of State, the bill never
left the governor's office where it was found on the following day by
Gov. Pindall. He erased the appro,.al of his predecessor and sent
the bill with a veto message to the Secretary of State as required
by law, where the act of disapproval was put on record. The court
held, although there was strong dissent, that when the bill was
signed by Gov. Moore, it thereupon became a law and that the gov-
ernor's approval could not thereafter be withdrawn by veto.
It was considered an immaterial fact that the approval and the
withdrawal of approval were the acts of different individuals, and
that if Gov. Moore had the power to withdraw his approval, then
Gov. Pindall had the same right. In the eyes of the law, they were
but one person, the governor of the State. Therefore, the one ele-
ment of contention was as to the power of a governor to withdraw
his approval of a bill.
Cooley, in his Constitutional Limitations, p. 154, states the rule
as follows: "The governor's approval is not complete until the bill
has passed beyond his control, by the constitutional and customary
mode of legislation; and at any time prior to that he may reconsider
and retract any approval previously made." But in the case under
consideration the court repudiated this idea and stated that approval
could not be withdrawn after the signing, regardless of the fact that
the governor still retained the actual physical control of the bill. In
support of its position the court relies on three decisions of the
United States Supreme Court; Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch. 49;
Gardner v. Barney, 6 Wall. 499; Seven Hickory v. Ellery, 103 U. S.
423.
Marbury v. Madison is distinguishable from the case under
discussion in that President Adams had filed the commission sought
to be withdrawn with the Secretary of State. It had thus passed
entirely beyond his control. None of the courts go so far as to say
that in such a case could he have withdrawn his approval. State v.
Whisner, 35 Kan. 271. In the case under consideration, the bill
never left the control of the governor. However, in Marbury v.
Madison, Chief Justice Marshall freely expresses his views on the
subject. He says, "The last act to be done by the president is the
signature of the commission. The time for deliberation has passed.
He has decided."
In Gardner v. Barney and Seven Hickory v, Ellery, supra, there
are also statements which support the view of the Arkansas court.
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Each of these decisions contains the following statement: "The bill
becomes a law when signed. Everything done after that is with a
view to preserving the evidence of its passage and approval." But
in reading the statements in these opinions it should be remembered
that in neither of these cases did the court have under consideration
a state of facts similar to those of the case under discussion.
When, however, we look at the authority on the other side of
the question, we find several cases almost identical with the one
under discussion. In People v. Hatch, 19 Ill. 283, the goveinor,
having signed a bill, his private secretary reported that fact to the
legislature. But before the bill left the governor's office, the gov-
ernor erased his approval and vetoed it. The court said: "The
prominent fact in this case is that the bill was not, for a moment,
out of the possession of the governor after he had placed his name
to it, until he had erased his name, and returned the bill with his
objections to the house in which it had originated. During all this
time he had complete control of it, and had he placed his name to it,
designedly and understandingly he could still have withdrawn it."
In People v. McCullough, 210 Ill. 488, under practically the same
state of facts, the court said: "If he should sign the bill and mark
it approved, he would have a right to reconsider his act and erase
his approval, while the bill still remained under his control." In
Weeks v. Smith, 81 Me. 538, the idea is still more forcefully put as
follows: "The signature of the governor to an at of the legislature
is conclusive evidence of the executive approval against every one
but himself. He alone should be permitted to dispute it, and only
then, while he holds control of the act, and before he shall have
deposited the same in the archives of the State."
What are the lines of reasoning that result in these two opposite
conclusions? One begins with the question: "What is the all-impor-
tant point in the governor's action, after which the bill becomes a
law ?" Surely it is not the mere manual delivery of the bill over to
the custodian of the State records. If not, then it must be the
approval of the governor. His signature is the evidence of that
approval. Therefore, it is at that point that the whole matter
crystallizes and the bill becomes a law. If it becomes a law, the
governor cannot revoke it.
The argument, on the other side, begins with the consideration
of the fact that in most of our States there are constitutional
provisions like those under consideration in Arkansas, which pro-
vided as follows: "The Secretary of State shall keep a full and accu-
rate record of all the official acts and proceedings of the governor,
and when required, lay the same with all papers, minutes and vouch-
ers'pertaining thereto, before either branch of the General Assem-
bly. He shall proceed to copy the acts, joint resolutions and memo-
rials of the General Assembly as soon as they are approved by the
governor and shall hand over copies thereof to the public printer."
The Secretary of State is thus made the custodian, and the only
one, of the records pertaining to the governor's office, and his office
is the only place where record evidence of the governor may be
found. From this it is clear that such, constitutional provisions are
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intended to provide a place where the record evidence of the acts
of the governor and the existence of the statute laws of a State
shall be kept. This being true, when a record made by those officers
in the manner and within the time prescribed by law is found in the
office of the Secretary of State, it is conclusive and unimpeachable
record evidence of the authenticity of the official acts therein
recorded. It should not be overturned by oral evidence. Weeks
v. Smith, 8i Me. 538; Tarlton v. Peggs, 18 Ind. 24. It is readily
seen that the bill, as recorded in the office of the Secretary of State,
is the bill as it left the governor's control. Whether the governor
changed his approval several times can make no difference, because
such would not appear on the record and would have to be shown
by evidence of less dignity. The courts are hostile to such attempts.
Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649. Even the courts which allow the
journals of the legislature to control the enrolled act, do not consider
the journals as evidence of less dignity.
There is another line, of argument in favor of allowing a gov-
ernor to withdraw his approval. It is by way of analogy. The
Senate or house can reconsider as long as the matter is within their
control. Why cannot the governor? The right to reconsider is a
necessary incident to the power to act. It is not peculiar to legis-
lative bodies, but is common to all human transactions where there
is discretion to be exercised. An individual may erase his name
from a deed as long as it is within his control; and even a court
of justice may reconsider its solemn judgments months after they
have been rendered. Should this approval of a law by the governor
be the solitary exception? If so, some great principle of public
policy should require it. For in all cases, both public and private, a
party may change his purpose and decision as long as the subject-
matter still remains before him.
These arguments in favor of the right of a governor to recon-
sider may not be any more logical than those on the other side, but
the conclusion deduced from them has the additional merit of being
practical. In the first place, it does away with the whole uncer-
tainty of relying on oral evidence. To be sure in the Arkansas case
under discussion, the court did not have so difficult a problem as
would ordinarily follow, with respect to the introduction of oral
testimony, because of the fact that Gov. Pindall's veto message con-
tained a statement of the fact that Gov. Moore had approved the
bill. But in the ordinary run of cases it would seem that the doc-
trine of the courts which hold the view contrary to that followed by
the Arkansas court, would be more conducive to certainty in the
law. For the conclusion set forth by that court might lead to great
confusion, since that which appears from the record to be the final
executive action in approving or disapproving a bill might be set
at naught by proof of prior inconsistent action on the same bill.
EXEMPTION CLAUSES IN ACCIDENT INSURANCE POLICIES.
The case of Bader v. Amsterdam Casualty Co., 112 N. W. io65,
recently decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, reveals the
difficulty which the courts have encountered in the interpretation of
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exemption clauses in accident insurance policies, and although the
rule of construction that policies should be construed in favor of the
insured, has been of universal application, yet the results have been
far from harmonious, because the rule has been given a wide scope
in some cases and a very limited one in others.
The insured in this case was shot by robbers, and there was no
evidence that he was negligent or in any way contributed to his
death. Hd had an accident policy in the defendant company which
allowed $2,500, in case of loss of life by accident with a "Special
Indemnity" clause alowing one-half of the full amount if the insured
met his death "by shooting," among several enumerated exceptions.
It is to be noted that the phrase "by shooting," if standing alone,
may literally mean death by shooting whether the insured shot him-
self with suicidal intent, or shot himself accidentally or was shot by
another. His beneficiary, the plaintiff, endeavored to recover the
face value of the policy which would really interpret the words to
mean that while shooting, as a sport (certain other sports were enu-
merated in the special clause), the insured was to recover $1,250,
but by being shot, he should recover $2,5oo. The trial court allowed
a recovery of $1,250, which was affirmed by this opinion, interpreting
the contract to mean that he could recover nothing if he killed him-
self intentionally, but bne-half the full value if he was killed by
another.
The exact phrase in controversy seems never to have been judi-
cially determined, but the plaintiff relied upon certain cases in which
the construction of doubtful words was discussed. Of them we
may say that where the policy did not state whether the act was
participated in by the insured, the doubt was decided in his favor
and it was held that it was to be implied that an act of his own voli-
tion only would excuse the company. One case hung on the phrase,
"death resulting from poisonous substances," and the court used
this language: "death from a rattlesnake bite is clearly from poison-
ous substances, but we presume that no one will contend that recov-
ery in such a death could be denied." All the plaintiff's cases, how-
ever, have peculiarities which are not found in the case at bar, which
may equally be said of those relied upon by the defendant.
The cases most like this one involve such phrases as "inhaling
gas," "poison" and the like, and seem to be quite contradictory.
Paul v. Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472, was one of the earliest cases on the
subject and held that death resulting to one while sleeping, was one
through accidental means when the insured had inhaled gas and he
was allowed to recover. The policy was to be construed by the
spirit as well as the letter, and that in expressing its intention not
to be liable for death from "inhaling gas" the company can only be
understood to mean a voluntary and intelligent act by the insured
and not an involuntary and unconscious act. This death was an
accident and "the cause came from the outside as surely as a fatal
rifle ball."
The Circuit Court of Appeals furnishes us with an unique situa-
tion. On October 3rd, 1898, the court by Sanborn, J., handed down
a decision holding that a death from poison accidentally taken under
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the mistaken belief that it was a harmless medicine was such a death
as exempted the company from payment under its policy,
(McGlother v. Provident Mut. Acc. Co., 89 Fed. 685). The rea-
soning of the court was that "the whole is greater than any of its
parts, and includes them all. Death from poison is greater than,
and necessarily includes, death from poison taken in any particular
way, because it includes death from poison taken in every way. It
includes death from poison taken intentionally or unintentionally."
Further, the parties had the right to enter into this contract which
was neither immoral, illegal, or contrary to public policy, and that
it should be strictly construed as written. Judge Thayer dissented
from this opinion, stating his reasons to be that the scope of the
exception should be more limited, and that the intent is a material
point-that if the poison is taken intentionally, there can be no
recovery, but if the death results from poison taken unintentionally,
it is clearly an accident which the policy covers. He relied on Paul
v. The Insurance Co., supa, and cases in Pennsylvania and in
Illinois, which had followed the Paul case; also the rule in The
U. S. Supreme Court, Pickett v. Ins. Co., 144 Pa. St. 79; Ins. Co. v.
Dunlap, i6o II1. 642; Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 58o, all of which
are authorities for the proposition that the exception against liabil-
ity must be understood "to mean a voluntary and intelligent act by
the insured," and if the act is not done intentionally or voluntarily
the insurer is still liable.
Just one year later, the same court was confronted by a similar
state of acts and Thayer, J., now delivered the majority opinion,
restating his dissenting views in the McGlother case, and dwelt at
some length on the fact that the highest courts of several States had
interpreted the same phrase against the company, for which reason
the Insurance Company, as if by estoppel, should not be heard to
urge its contentions on that court. Sanborn, J., dissented in this
opinion and referred to his majority opinion in the McGlother case,
Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Lowenstein, 97 Fed. 17. Neither case seems to
have been appealed.
The contract declares to the insured, that, though he may be
killed or injured through violence and accidental means, yet if the
calamity occurs under certain circumstances, the insurers will not be
liable, The contract in its broadest scope only embraces within its
indemnity personal injuries effected through forcible and accidental
means, and the proviso simply excludes from this class of injuries
all that occurred under the circumstances enumerated. Southard v.
Assurance Co., 34 Conn. 574.
This is undoubtedly a rule of some merit and the courts will
strictly construe contracts that are clear and unambiguous, but where
the policy contains words of doubtful meaning, the decision has
been generally against the compan r on the ground that "the insurer
draws up the policy and he is presumed to have employed words
which express his real intention." Dunning v. Mass., etc., Associa-
tion, 99 Maine 39o. The courts holding the opposite view have
criticised the New York, Pennsylvania and Illinois rule because the
insured need not enter into the contract with the company, but once
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he does, both should be pari passu, and the rule of construing against
the insurer and in favor of the insured, which Sanborn, J., has called
the much abused rule, ought not to have any weight. Many of the
authorities which have refused to follow the majority rule have had
special reasons for their decisions. Pref. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Robinson,
45 Fla. 525.
The very earliest forms of accident policy made exemptions in
case of suicide and so it seems reasonable to presume that words of
doubtful construction should be interpreted to mean that intentional
death only should excuse the company, while death from purely acci-
dental and external means could only excuse the insurer from pay-
ment when the language was so clear as to be unmistakable.
The Bader case seems to be a virtual victory for the majority
rule and we think the full indemnity would have been allowed if it
were not for the "special indemnity" clause. Both on reason and
authority the decision seems fully justifiable and it will be inter-
esting to note the stand which the courts, concurring in Judge San-
born's view will take when they have to determine the phrase "by
shooting."
EXTENT OF INDEFINITE EASEMENT AS EFFECTED BY THE EXTENT TO
WHICH IT HAS BEEN USED.
The New-Jersey Court of Chancery has recently handed down
a decision of great interest upon a question of much importance in
this, the period of formation of the large pipe line systems of the
future. In the case of Standard Oil Company v. Buchi, 66 Atl.
(N. J.) 427, the plaintiff company acquired by deed from the defend-
ants "the right to lay down pipes for the transportation of petroleum
and to operate the same over" the lands, "together with all the right
and privileges incident and necessary to the enjoyment of the grant
and removal of the pipes." The plaintiff had twice exercised the
right, but when he attempted to lay a third pipe over defendant's
land close beside the others the defendants prevented it by vio-
lence. The plaintiff asks for an injunction to restrain such inter-
ferertce. The court held that that which was granted was not an
easement as there was no dominant estate: that it was not a license,
for a license is revokable, and this right was not: but that it was
a positive and permanent interest or estate in the land: and that
the previous exercise of the right did not define the extent of the
right so as to prevent the laying of the third pipe. The injunction
was granted with an order that plaintiff make compensation for
additional damages occasioned by the laying of the third pipe.
The earliest view of this question is that where a right of way
has been granted in general terms without specifying the width, the
grantee is presumed to take a fee in the full width allowed by the
charter, regardless of what is actually occupied. The question orig-
inally arose in cases where railroads had not occupied the whole of
the grant allowed by their charter. This view was arrived at from
a consideration of the power of eminent domain, and of the interest
so appropriated.
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The right of eminent domain is inherent in the legislature and
may be exercised by that body whenever public necessity requires.
Otherwise, notwithstanding the public necessity, public ways would
be impossible without the landowner's consent. That just com-
pensation be assessed and tendered is the only limit placed on the
exercise of this power. The legislature is the sole judge of what
is of public necessity. The courts cannot question the decision, else
they would, in effect, be taking this power from the legislature and
vesting it in themselves, and the decisions as to public necessity
might be as diverse and numerous as there are jurisdictions. Pub-
lic ways might be prevented by the decision of a single court. Con-
fusion has resulted from mistaking the manner of determining what
is of public necessity, and what tribunal determines the necessity.
As to the interest or estate appropriated, it is. plain that the
grantee is to have a fee in the whole-tract granted. The full value
of the land taken at the time it was taken has been paid as damages
and nothing less than a fee was considered. So the grantee is pre-
sumed to take the full width allowed by charter regardless of what
is actually occupied. The Water Works Company of Indianapolis,
et al. v. Burkhart, et al., 41 Ind. 364; Campbell v. The Indianapolis
& Vincennes Railroad Company, i io Ind. 490; The People v. Smith,
21 N. Y. 595.
The attitude of the courts, however, changed later, and the grant
was somewhat limited by them. According to this later view, the
grantee has the free and perfect use of the land taken, so far as it
is necessary to carry out the grantee's purposes. The former owner
still holds the fee and may use it to the extent that his use does not
interfere with that of the grantee. Upon the abandonment of the
grant or discontinuance of its use by the grantee, all reverts back to
the owner. But until then, the grantee has the paramount right.
His right is commensurate with his necessities, and so may or may
not require the full use of the grant. The grantee is the judge of
what use his necessities require, and the courts cannot interfere
where the grantee, in good faith, extends the use. Public necessity
gives and limits the right of eminent domain, and if a mere easement
is sufficient to accomplish the public purpose, a fee will not be taken.
So, only so much land will be taken, not adversely held by another,
as is reasonably necessary for the convenient use and maintenance
of the grantee's purpose. This view is based upon the well-known
principle that with a grant of power to accomplish any particular
enterprise, and especially one of a public nature, is given authority
to do all the necessary things to accomplish the principal object, so
far as the grantor's own power extends. Kansas City Railway v.
Allen, 22 Kan. 285; Babcock v. Western Railroad Corporation, 9
Metc. (Mass.) 553; Day, Williams & Co. v. Railroad Company, 41
0. St. 392; Railroad Company v. Telford's Ex'rs., 89 Tenn. 293;
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. McReynolds, 48 S. W. (Tenn.) 258.
The next and most recent view of the question is that it is an
easement, and being granted in general terms cannot be extended by
the grantee beyond the limits of the use first given it. This view
is based on the following considerations: The grant is general and
YALE LAW JOURNAL
indefinite as it does not specify the number or the size of the pipes,
nor does it define or limit the place in which they are to be laid.
However, these are not left unlimited to the grantee. The inten-
tion of the parties concerning the limits can be arrived at only by
considering the entire instrument, the circumstances surrounding
the execution thereof, the situation of the parties and their acts con-
temporaneous therewith, which have a legitimate tendency to show
such intention. If a greater right than the one used be shown to be
intended, the right would still exist to the grantee regardless of the
extent to which it had been exercised. By the instrument "the
right of way to lay pipes" is granted. The grantee clearly had, at
the outset, the right to lay any size pipe or any number of pipes,
within what would be considered a reasonable exercise of the grant.
So the grantee contends that as the word pipes, being plural, enti-
tles him to a more extensive use of the grant at the outset, it was
not the intention of the parties to limit the grantee to a single pipe.
The wording, however, is general and indefinite and does not show
that the grantee was intended to have the right to extend the use
from time to time. By the first exercise thereof, the general and
indefinite easement becomes fixed and certain and cannot be exer-
cised in any other place. The right once exercised in a fixed and
defined course with the full acquiescence and consent of both parties,
becomes and is as specific in respect to the extent thereof as if the
extent had been particularly described in the grant, and neither
party may change it without the consent of the other. Both parties
are bound by the election. Such a limitation to the right is required
by convenience and justice, else a continuing burden and an unre-
strained control by the grantee would be cast upon the land. The
single invasion does not warrant numberless invasions. "This rule
rests upon the principle that where the terms of the contract are
general or indefinite, so that its construction is uncertain and ambig-
uous, the act of the parties contemporaneous with the grant giving
a practical construction to it, shall be deemed to be a just exposition
of the intent of the parties." This same reasoning applies as well
to the size of the pipe as to the number of pipes. Winslow v. Val-
lejo, 84 Pac. (Cal.) 191; Sked v. Pennington Spring Water Com-
pany, 65 Atl. (N. J.) 713; Jennison v. Walker, ii Gray (Mass.)
423; Onthank v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 194.
The holding of the court in the recent case accords with the
second view above. This view is the best as it is most subservient
of the interests involved. In each view the grant was construed
from the intention of the parties as shown by the wording of the
grant, the situation of the parties, and their contemporaneous acts.
However, all courts are agreed that the grantee alone shall judge
the extent of the first user under the grant. The first view permits
an extension thereof to the full width given by the grant, without
any interference by the grantor or the courts, if the grantee sees
fit. This view is too broad as it permits the grantee to act from
mercenary motives. The second view permits interference only
when the grantee acts capriciously in the matter. The third view
abandons all precedent and takes away from the grantee not only his
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right to judge in the matter, but also the very right itself to extend
the use. It thereby gives the courts the power of eminent domain.
The second view, and the trend of the decisions, is to let the grantee
judge and act for himself in the matter, so long as he does so in good
faith. Again, in each case, the consideration paid is for the fullest
enjoyment of the grant, and as the grantor has been paid in full, it
would be dearly unjust to give the grantee anything less than that
for which he has paid. Finally, in each and every case, both parties
must have had in mind the fact that the business of the grantee
would increase if the grantee was successful. The grantee could
not know what extent his future business would require him to make
of the first use of the right granted. The grantor knows this and
sees that the grantee's first use is clearly measured by the necessities
existing at the time of the first use, else the grantee would have
taken more. So the only intention that could be construed from the
act of the parties is that the grantee took what the necessities at the
time required, and as further necessities arose requiring a further
use of the grant it would only be fair to permit the grantee so to
extend the use as to meet the necessity. The growth and develop-
ment of great pipe line systems should not be retarded by so narrow
a view of the question as expressed by the latest line of authorities,
nor should the owners thereof be allowed to use their charters as
a cloak to conceal their mercenary purposes as the oldest authorities
permit. But so long as they, impelled solely by necessity, act in
good faith and within reason, courts should encourage and protect
them in all that they do. For these reasons the holding of the New
Jersey court seems most just and fair.
